Energy Transition Outlook 2026

OECD Pacific

A forecast of the energy transition in the region to 2060, based on the data from DNV's Energy Transition Outlook 2026

Key takeaways
  • DNV’s Energy Transition Outlook for OECD Pacific covers Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. Electrification and energy security drive the energy transition.
  • By 2060, DNV forecasts electricity demand to rise 65%. Final energy demand falls 30% as demographic change and efficiency gains reduce consumption.
  • Solar supplies over half the region’s electricity by 2060; wind and nuclear together provide 34%. Batteries help balance renewable generation.
  • Fossil-fuel imports fall 77% by 2060, strengthening energy security.
  • Hydrogen, ammonia, and e-fuels meet 6% of final energy demand by 2060. Carbon capture and storage helps decarbonize industry.
  • DNV forecasts energy- and process-related CO₂ emissions to fall 86% by 2060, but remain above zero in 2050 after CCS and DAC. Transport and manufacturing dominate residual emissions in 2060. 

This region consists of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.

Metric

2026

2060

Population

206 million

 181 million

GDP*

USD 11 trillion

USD 14 trillion

GDP/person

USD 54,300  

USD 77,400  

Primary energy use

35 EJ

29 EJ

Primary energy use/person

 170 GJ

160 GJ

CO2 emissions**

  2 Gt

 0.3 Gt

CO2 emissions/person

 9.7 tonnes

 1.7 tonnes

*All GDP figures in the report are based on 2017 purchasing power parity and in 2023 international USD.

**Energy- and process-related CO2 emissions, after CCS and DAC.

The OECD Pacific faces surging electricity demand and accelerating renewable energy growth, but persistent fossil-fuel dependence, grid constraints, and policy uncertainties complicate efforts to balance energy security with decarbonization goals.

 

81 %

fossil fuels

in primary energy supply

32 %

Import reliance

of primary energy supply

26 %

Renewable sources

in power generation

Where OECD Pacific stands

  • Fossil fuels make up 81% of primary energy supply in the region. In 2025, coal, oil, and natural gas accounted for 60% of power generation and 69% of energy use in demand sectors.
  • Import dependence is high. In 2025, 32% of the region’s primary energy supply was imported. Japan and South Korea rely on foreign fossil fuel sources for 86% and 84% of total energy supply, respectively (IEA, 2026a, b). For crude oil, the Middle East accounts for about 95% and 70% of imports into Japan and South Korea (Tan, 2026). Australia also imports oil but exports coal and gas.
  • Renewable sources account for 26% of power generation in the region but reached 35% in Australia and 88% in New Zealand. Nuclear accounts for 14% of power generation, increasing the non-fossil share to 40%.

 

 

Key agendas shaping OECD Pacific’s energy transition

Geopolitics and supply chains 

– Geopolitical uncertainty continues to reshape policy across the region. Climate strategies are broadening from emissions reduction alone to include energy security and industrial competitiveness.

– Supply-chain resilience remains a priority. Countries are deepening clean-energy partnerships, overseas investments, and supply cooperation. Economies in the region have economic ties to both China and Western countries. Australia and New Zealand are particularly dependent on exports to China, with Australia’s exports concentrated in commodities such as coal and iron ore, and New Zealand’s in agricultural products.

– As major oil and LNG importers, Japan and South Korea are strengthening cooperation on fuel procurement and transportation, arrangements for mutual supply, and engagement with resource-producing countries to optimize investments (METI, 2026a). 

Energy security is paramount amid rising risks 

– Energy security and lower import dependence are at the core of the region’s transition strategies.

– South Korea’s National Sovereign Government Energy Transition Promotion Plan (April 2026) elevates renewables-based electrification to reduce fossil-fuel dependence (MCEE, 2026a). The USD 747bn Korean-Green Transition (K-GX) plan (2026-2035) supports renewables, industrial decarbonization, and new growth industries. Japan’s 7th Strategic Energy Plan strengthens decarbonized power supply, including renewables and nuclear (METI, 2026b).

– New Zealand’s Energy Package focuses on energy security through market reforms, investment certainty, LNG import capacity, and faster renewable deployment (NZ Government, 2025a). Its Fuel Security Plan bolsters fuel imports, stockholding, and domestic fuel alternatives (NZ Government, 2025b).

– Australia is debating measures to address high dependence on imported refined oil products (~90%) (Evans, 2026). Measures include the Australian Fuel Security and Resilience package and agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Singapore on refined liquid fuels. At the same time, Australia remains a reliable major LNG exporter, with Japan and South Korea among its key markets. 

Strengthening resilience, decarbonization, and competitiveness in parallel 

– Decarbonization and clean growth remain strategic priorities, with energy and industrial policies increasingly aimed at reducing dependencies, strengthening resilience, and boosting competitiveness by leveraging established strengths.

– The Future Made in Australia agenda targets market diversification and domestic manufacturing and processing, but funding commitments are lacking under political pressure to cut budget costs (Cropp, 2026). Japan's GX Strategy and South Korea's Strategic Industry Fund and K-GX plan back key industries to strengthen technological sovereignty. Government co-financing, public procurement, and domestic content preferences are increasingly used to support national competitiveness and innovation (Choi, 2025).  

 

Energy transition indicators

Fig 1

Primary energy supply (EJ/yr)

Fossil fuels continue to dominate the primary energy mix in OECD Pacific, accounting for 81% of total supply at present. Their share steadily declines over the coming decades as renewable and nuclear energy sources rise. By 2060, fossil fuels will still play an important role in the region’s energy mix, accounting for 27% of primary energy. Solar and nuclear emerge as the region’s largest energy sources, accounting for 25% and 23% of total supply in 2060, respectively. This shift is largely driven by solar growth in Australia and nuclear expansion in Japan and South Korea. Wind and bioenergy also grow rapidly over our forecast period, resulting in a more diverse energy mix than today.  

 

Fig 2

Final energy demand 

Final energy demand is similarly dominated by fossil fuels, accounting for 69% of today’s energy demand. Over the coming decades, final energy demand will decrease from 24 EJ today to 17 EJ, driven by population decline and efficiency gains associated with electrification. Electricity demand, by contrast, grows rapidly and overtakes fossil fuels, making up over half of final energy demand in 2060. Oil and natural gas shares drop significantly but will still represent 15% and 16% of final energy demand respectively in 2060, reflecting their continued, though reduced, role.

Fig 3

Electricity generation 

Electricity generation in the OECD Pacific almost doubles by 2060. At the same time, the power mix shifts dramatically from fossil to renewable and nuclear sources. Fossil-fired generation falls from around 60% today to 5% by 2060. Solar becomes the largest source of electricity generation, supplying more than half of all electricity in the region. Wind grows more than 11-fold and nuclear doubles, together providing 34% of generation. 

Fig 4

CO2 emissions by sector (GtCO2/yr)

Emissions in OECD Pacific are projected to decline by 86% by 2060. The power sector drives most of this reduction, primarily through phasing out coal and building out renewables. Transport emissions are expected to fall by 82%, and manufacturing 77%. Despite these reductions, transport and manufacturing will remain key contributors, accounting for 31% and 35%, respectively, of total emissions in 2060.

Key forecast findings: how the energy transition is unfolding

Electrification accelerates as demographics shift

OECD Pacific comprises four advanced economies with a high standard of living, but with markedly different economic and energy profiles. Japan and South Korea have large and complex industrial sectors, while Australia and New Zealand are more resource- and land-intensive economies, with important mining and agricultural sectors. The region is geographically disconnected as none of the countries in this region share common borders or connected power grids. Electricity demand will rise despite a declining population. At the same time, fossil fuel dependency wanes due to energy security concerns, and we see a marked shift towards renewable energy and increased share of nuclear power.

Declining population reduces energy demand

Final energy demand declines despite continued economic growth, reflecting a combination of demographic change, electrification, and improving energy efficiency. With only 3% of the world’s population, OECD Pacific is the smallest of the 10 regions defined in our Energy Transition Outlook (ETO), and it is getting smaller. The population declines significantly towards 2060, most notably in Japan and South Korea, where ageing populations are accompanied by shrinking working-age populations. At the same time, growing electrification shifts energy consumption towards more efficient end-use technologies. Together, these trends contribute to a 30% decline in final energy demand by 2060, even as electricity demand continues to grow.  

Fig 5

Electricity demand continues to rise

Though tempered by population decline and continued efficiency improvements, electricity demand in the OECD Pacific will increase by 65% to 2060 and electricity will become the main energy carrier. Electrification will be especially apparent in road transport, which still has a low proliferation of electric vehicles (EVs). The uptake of heat pumps, and new loads from AI-driven compute needs and hydrogen production also contribute to increased demand.

Transport, mainly road, is the single largest contributor to rising electricity demand, accounting for 66% of additional demand towards 2060. Although EV uptake remains slower than in other advanced economies, electrification accelerates across the region as more affordable EV models enter the market and charging networks expand. Growing concerns over fuel-price volatility and energy security also strengthen the case for EV adoption, reducing fossil fuel import dependence. This was evident in Australia in 2026, where EV sales surged as fuel prices rose sharply following the war in Iran (Tregenza, 2026). Australia’s free trade agreement with China means that the uptake of Chinese EV’s is rapidly accelerating, with virtually no trade barriers nor incentives for protectionism.

Progress remains uneven across the region. In Japan, consumer preference for hybrid vehicles and limited charging infrastructure slow EV adoption. South Korea, on the other hand, has the highest EV penetration in the region and benefits from strong policy support and domestic automotive manufacturing. EV adoption across the region is expected to accelerate over the next decade, with the number of EVs increasing 10-fold before reaching 90% of the vehicle stock by 2060.  

Fig 6

Data centres and AI are emerging as a major source of new electricity demand, accounting for 24% of additional demand by 2060. Investments in data centres, cloud computing, AI, and semiconductor manufacturing are accelerating across the region, driven by both government initiatives and private-sector investment. These industries require large volumes of reliable electricity and often seek rapid deployment, placing increasing pressure on the energy system. The challenge is particularly visible in Japan, where data-centre growth is concentrated around Tokyo and Osaka while many renewable projects are located elsewhere, increasing transmission needs. By 2060, energy demand from AI and data centres more than quadruples.

Fig 7

Energy security priorities reinforce the shift towards renewable energy and nuclear

Energy security has become an increasingly important driver for the OECD Pacific’s energy transition. Unlike Europe, the OECD Pacific consists of geographically isolated energy systems with no shared electricity grids, limiting the ability to rely on neighbouring countries during supply disruptions. Despite rapid renewable growth in recent years, fossil fuels still account for 81% of primary energy supply, with 41% of this imported. Import dependence is particularly pronounced in Japan and South Korea, where fossil fuel imports account for roughly 86% and 84% of energy supply, respectively (IEA, 2026a,b). South Korea imported 70% of its crude oil in 2025 from the Middle East but aims to reduce this to 50% by 2035 (Reuters, 2026).

The Iran war has highlighted the region’s vulnerability to imported fossil fuels. As a result, energy policy is increasingly shaped not only by decarbonization objectives, but also by the need to reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels, strengthen resilience to supply disruptions, and limit exposure to price volatility. In Japan and South Korea, the disruption has reinforced the importance of long-term LNG contracts and diversified sources of supply, helping to shield against volatile spot prices. In South Korea, LNG remains necessary for peak demand, winter consumption, and grid balancing. High LNG prices and constrained supply have temporarily increased the country’s reliance on coal. However, this does not signal a broader resurgence of coal across the region. In Australia, an ageing and increasingly unreliable coal fleet limits its ability to provide long-term energy security. Fossil fuel’s role in the region will transition to a flexibility reserve and temporary insurance, rather than a major part of the future energy mix.

The near- to long-term response is accelerating investment in domestic energy sources. Australia is rapidly expanding solar and battery deployment, while Japan and South Korea are pursuing a combination of renewables and nuclear. In Japan, policy is moving beyond reactor restarts and towards lifetime extensions. In South Korea nuclear expansion is still relevant, but a greater weight is placed on renewables. In April, the government announced a target of 100 GW renewable capacity by 2030, expanding its share of power generation to over 20% and accelerating its previous target (MCEE, 2026b). South Korea has also recently unveiled a USD 747bn green investment plan for 2026 to 2035 through the Korea-Green Transformation (GX), which aims to cut emissions, expand clean energy, and help its industries compete in a lower-carbon economy (Hong, 2026).

As a result, fossil fuel imports decline significantly over our forecast period. By 2060, we forecast fossil fuel imports will have fallen by 77%, pushed out by the expansion of renewables and nuclear. With energy security embedded more firmly in policy, investments are increasingly reinforced in renewables, storage, and nuclear power, accelerating the shift towards a more self-sufficient and resilient energy system.

Fig 8

The future is solar

Solar power will come to dominate the power generation mix in 2060, generating over 51% of electricity in the region. We see the beginnings of this shift to solar very clearly today. Australia has the world’s largest uptake of rooftop solar, with more than one-third of households now having rooftop PV (IEA, 2026c). Long-standing support, favourable sunny conditions, and an abundance of stand-alone homes in urban areas have helped drive this deployment. Meanwhile, Japan, the world's fourth-largest solar generator, has tripled its solar generation in a decade (Ember, 2026).  

Fig 9

As solar deployment accelerates, storage will play an increasingly important role in providing power system flexibility. Batteries shift solar generation from periods of high daytime output to evening demand peaks, reducing curtailment and reliance on gas-fired generation. The Australian government has introduced the Solar Shares Offer, a regulated energy offer that provides households with three hours of free electricity during the day (DCEEW, 2026a). The measure encourages greater consumption when solar output is high and helps balance the timing of supply and demand by absorbing abundant solar generation while reducing evening peak demand.

Across the region, we forecast utility-scale storage capacity to grow from a mere 43 GW today to nearly 713 GW in 2060, with 55% of that being Li-ion with utility scale solar. Australia, the world’s largest battery market on a per capita basis, is leading deployment in the region, driven by falling battery costs and strong policy support (Bloomberg, 2026) However, momentum differs between market segments. Residential battery deployment has accelerated rapidly with government support through the Cheaper Home Batteries program, while challenging project economics are creating headwinds for some utility-scale projects. South Korea launched its first nationwide battery auction in 2025, awarding 565 MW of storage projects to support variable renewable integration (IEA, 2026c), while Japan is encouraging deployment through solar-curtailment incentives.  

Fig 10

Wind supports the transition

Behind solar, wind is the next largest generator of electricity in 2060 at just over 18% of the electricity generation mix, divided into 12% onshore and 6% offshore, floating, and fixed.

In Australia, onshore wind is already well established. Offshore wind, on the other hand, is facing significant challenges. Developers are withdrawing or downscaling their projects due to costs and supply chain constraints. However, the government remains committed to supporting offshore wind efforts through regulatory frameworks and designated offshore wind areas.

South Korea and Japan have the largest offshore wind possibilities, and both have installation targets. South Korea aims to reach 14.3 GW by 2030, with an ambitious plan to add around 4 GW of new offshore wind capacity a year (IEEFA, 2026). It has already broken ground on the 390 MW Shinan UI offshore wind project, which is being funded entirely domestically, as part of efforts to strengthen energy security and develop its domestic industrial supply chain (Dong-chan, 2026). Japan targets 10 GW by 2030 and 30–45 GW, including floating offshore wind, by 2040. However, a gap remains between policy ambition and actual project deliverability; the withdrawal of Mitsubishi Corporation and C-Tech from the three projects awarded in the first auction round prompted a reassessment of auction design, project economics, and the allocation of inflation, construction, and delivery risks (Tech for impact, 2026).

New Zealand’s geography is well suited to wind, and onshore wind is already well established, with the Turitea and Waipipi wind farms as the largest installations. New Zealand is also looking to developing offshore wind capacity in the future with its Offshore Renewable Energy Act, which came into effect in July 2026.

Several barriers could constrain the expansion of wind capacity. In all four countries, wind developers need many different levels of approvals – including jurisdictional and environmental. These can take time – which could slow down the pace of installations. Evolving regulatory frameworks could also slow down the process, as requirements increase or shift, though favourable regulatory changes could help fast track wind projects. Inflation, high construction costs and labour constraints are all pressing problems affecting the financial viability of new projects. And finally, installations will also need to receive community support, which today is often lacking. Concerns regarding land use changes, visual impacts, new transmission lines, noise, and biodiversity impacts could also slow down the process of installations as they are challenged in the government and court system.

Despite these barriers, wind is set to grow considerably over the coming decades. Installed wind capacity is set to more than double the next five years and will continue to double on average every nine years. Total installed capacity will grow eight-fold by 2060, with growth primarily coming from onshore wind. Offshore wind will also grow considerably over our forecast period and will account for 24% of installed wind capacity in 2060.

Fig 11

Nuclear regains strategic importance

Nuclear energy will also play a key role in the power generation mix; of all our regions, OECD Pacific has the highest percentage of its electricity generation supplied by nuclear power in 2060 (16%). South Korea is the leader in this area, with nearly 30% of its electricity generation powered by nuclear. For South Korea, investing in nuclear is one path to reducing energy-import dependence. Under its 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, South Korea plans to build two new large nuclear reactors, totalling 2.8 GW, by 2038, and a 0.7 GW small modular reactor (SMR) operational by 2035 (IEA, 2025). South Korea leads the way in the development of nuclear technology and is also looking to continue technology exports to other countries. In Japan, following the Fukushima disaster in 2011, all the country’s nuclear reactors were shut down and energy policy shifted away from nuclear. Now, with rising energy demand, rising costs of importing energy, pressure to decarbonize, and concerns about energy security Japan is re-examining its nuclear policy.

The restart of Unit 6 at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station in April 2026, after approximately 14 years offline, marked a major milestone in Japan’s nuclear revival, though remains politically and socially sensitive (Johnston, 2026). Japan aims to increase nuclear power to 20% of its electricity mix by 2040 (Tatsujiro, 2026). Achieving this target may require reactor restarts, lifetime extensions and, eventually, the construction of next-generation reactors. In New Zealand, the focus is more on nuclear fusion technologies and SMRs, which are still early in the development process.

Grid constraints slow the transition

Expanding transmission grids to connect new renewable installations is increasingly becoming a bottleneck. With grid investment accelerating worldwide, competition for materials and skilled labour is driving up costs and causing delays across the globe, including in OECD Pacific. Grid expansion is also complicated by the geographical mismatch between areas with the favourable conditions for generating renewable energy and the locations where demand is centred. At the same time, severe weather conditions, such as storms, floods, and landslides, which are increasing in frequency with climate change, can threaten grid infrastructure. Finally, expansion will depend on securing a social license for the transition, requiring support from both the general public and communities and landholders who will host the infrastructure (Davis, 2025).

In Japan, grid congestion is already hampering the deployment of renewable energy. Its system of non-firm grid access allows projects to connect before sufficient grid capacity is guaranteed, but generators face a greater risk of having their output curtailed when the network is congested. Connected generators may be curtailed under redispatch rules when network congestion occurs, creating uncertainty over project revenues and bankability. Dedicated access-line costs and some distribution-level reinforcement costs may also remain with the connecting generator. Systematic change to the grid reservation system will be required to address these barriers.

In Australia, a robust grid expansion plan will be central to the success of the transition, but this is a highly political issue. Approaches to coordinating renewable generation and reducing grid expansion requirements differ across jurisdictions, from coordinated Renewable Energy Zones, to locating generation closer to demand centres, and increasing reliance on distributed rooftop solar and battery storage, an area where Australia leads the way.

In South Korea, there is a geographical mismatch between generation and consumption, with much of the country’s generation located on the east and south coasts, while demand is concentrated in the Seoul region in the northwest. The government has recognized that importance of grid expansion in meeting increasing demand from further electrification, including from data centres. In 2025, it set out a strategy in the 11th Basic Plan for Long-Term Electricity Supply and the Energy Trifecta Bill.

New Zealand has a similar mismatch between generation on the South Island and electricity demand on the North Island, making the maintenance and strengthening of the Cook Strait cable key. Through state-owned Transpower’s Net Zero Grid Pathways programme, the country is planning the transmission upgrades needed to meet growing electricity demand.

New energy commodities support the transition beyond electrification

While electricity becomes the dominant energy carrier across the region, not all sectors can easily be electrified. Hard-to-abate sectors such as steel, chemicals, shipping, and aviation require alternative decarbonization pathways, increasing the role of new energy commodities and technologies – including hydrogen, ammonia, sustainable fuels, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Scaling these solutions will require extensive new infrastructure, supply chains, and regional trade networks. By 2060, hydrogen, ammonia, and e-fuels are projected to account for 6% of final energy demand in OECD Pacific, around double the global figure.  

Fig 12

Hydrogen ambitions become more targeted

Hydrogen demand in the region doubles towards 2060, with power, heat, and manufacturing driving most of future growth. Today, demand is dominated by refining, which accounts for 93% of hydrogen demand. In the near term, demand emerges from electricity and heat generation. OECD Pacific will have the largest hydrogen demand for electricity and heat of all the 10 ETO regions. In the medium to long term, demand also emerges from manufacturing as hydrogen supports industrial decarbonization. Hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI) could eventually create new demand from iron and steel production in Australia, although deployment remains at an early stage. Hydrogen has limited relevance in buildings and road transport, where electrification provides a more efficient and economical alternative. In 2060, synthetic fuels, manufacturing, and electricity and heat generation will be the largest consumers.

Strong policy momentum has yet to translate into deployment at scale. High production costs, infrastructure requirements, and uncertainty over future demand continue to slow deployment with several projects either delayed, cancelled, or resized. Policy has largely focused on supporting production, but commercially viable projects also require stronger demand signals and greater willingness to pay for the decarbonization, energy security, and resilience that low-carbon fuels can provide. The federal government of Australia is currently consulting on demand side policy.

The cancellation of the proposed 10 MW H2Kwinana renewable hydrogen project in Western Australia after failing to secure support under the Hydrogen Headstart programme, highlights the challenges for further development (Argus, 2026). Several proposed projects have also struggled to reach final investment decisions, despite production incentives and public funding.  

Fig 13

Policy ambition nevertheless remains high. Japan is moving from strategy to project implementation under the Hydrogen Society Promotion Act, while Australia maintains strong ambitions to scale domestic hydrogen production through its Future Made in Australia programme. By 2060, we forecast hydrogen production to double, though we have revised our forecast downward from last year reflecting slower project development and persistent challenges in establishing commercially viable supply and demand. New growth will primarily come from renewable electrolysis.

New energy commodities reshape regional trade

The regional market for hydrogen is shaped by a structural divide between resource-rich Australia and the industrial economies of Japan and South Korea. Australia’s combination of high renewable capacities, land availability, and natural resources positions the country as a suitable producer and exporter of renewable new energy commodities. Although renewable hydrogen deployment has been slower than anticipated in Australia, the country has introduced policies aimed at supporting projects towards commercial scale. Australia has also set an ambitious target of producing 15 Mt of hydrogen annually by 2050, with a stretch potential of 30 Mt (DCCEEW, 2024). In contrast, Japan and South Korea are expected to remain import-dependant as limited land and resources constrain domestic production potential. This complementarity creates opportunities for new intra-regional value chains, but their development depends on achieving costs that importing countries are willing to pay.

The new market for new energy commodities changes rather than eliminates import dependence. Japan and South Korea will reduce their reliance on imported fossil fuels, but growing demand for hydrogen, ammonia, and other low-carbon commodities creates new import dependencies. Imports of clean hydrogen and derivatives were expected to take centre stage in South Korea’s energy future, but a change in government and the war in Iran have shifted the focus to domestic clean energy generation, and hydrogen imports could be sidelined to a supporting role.

Australia is well positioned to produce renewable new energy commodities at scale, although its strongest export opportunities may lie in hydrogen-derived products rather than hydrogen itself. Producing green iron, ammonia, methanol, and synthetic fuels before export can avoid some of the cost and complexity associated with transporting hydrogen while creating greater domestic value. Green iron is particularly attractive, as Australia's renewable resources can be combined with iron ore and hydrogen production to supply lower-carbon feedstock to steelmakers in Japan and South Korea, as well as major markets outside the region such as Germany.

Realizing these trade opportunities will require investment well beyond production facilities. New renewable generation, ports, storage terminals, pipelines, and specialized vessels must be developed alongside common standards for emissions accounting, safety, and sustainability. Long-term offtake agreements will also be critical to support investment and establish viable trade corridors.

CCS enables deeper industrial decarbonization

CCS provides a complementary pathway for emissions that cannot be avoided through renewable electricity or hydrogen. The regional opportunity extends beyond individual capture projects. Japan and South Korea have large concentrations of industrial emissions but comparatively limited domestic storage options and resources, creating demand for regional CO2 transport and permanent storage. Australia and other parts of Asia Pacific offer substantially greater geological storage potential and could play an important role in a future regional carbon-management system.

Momentum is already building across the region. Japan is advancing commercial-scale CCS under its Green Transformation (GX) strategy, targeting annual storage volumes of 6-12 MtCO2 by 2030 and 120-240 MtCO2 by 2050 (IEA, 2023). The Carbon Dioxide Storage Business Act, fully enforced since May 2026, also establishes the regulatory framework for CO₂ storage and exploration rights, supporting the development of commercial CCS projects in Japan (METI, 2026c). Australia currently has 18 CCS projects in various stages of development, including two commercial-scale projects with a combined storage capacity of 17.3 MtCO2 (DCEEW, 2026b; Chevron, n.d; Santos, n.d). As projects move from demonstration to commercial deployment, we forecast CCS volumes in OECD Pacific to increase nearly 50-fold by 2060.

Fig 14

Emissions

Climate ambitions remain high across the region, with all four countries committed to carbon neutrality or net-zero by 2050 and intermediate emission-reduction goals. Aggregated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for the OECD Pacific countries imply a target of reducing GHG emissions by 6% by 2030, relative to 1990. Our forecast indicates that energy- and process-related CO2 emissions only fall by 1% over this period (after CCS and DAC), meaning that the region falls short of its intermediate target. The region also does not fully achieve net-zero by 2050. By 2050, emissions decline to 486 MtCO2 (net of CCS and DAC).

Fig 15

The region’s decarbonization is primarily driven by declining coal use and increased adoption of renewables, rapid power-sector decarbonization, electrification, and continued improvements in energy efficiency. Falling population and declining primary energy demand further reduce emissions over the forecast period.

As the transition progresses, emissions become increasingly concentrated in hard-to-abate sectors. By 2060, transport and manufacturing account for most residual emissions despite substantial reductions from current levels. Transport emissions decline by 82% compared with 2025 as electric vehicles gain market share, but progress is limited by the continued reliance on fossil fuels in aviation and shipping, as well as the challenges associated with electrifying heavy-duty transport. Manufacturing emissions decline 77% by 2060 as the sector electrifies and renewables penetrate the energy mix. However, achieving further reductions increasingly depends on the successful deployment of low-carbon hydrogen, CCS, and other emissions-abatement technologies.  

Key policy observations

The region is predominantly focused on implementing and revising existing energy and climate policy frameworks.

Climate targets

All countries have updated their 2035 NDCs and pledged carbon neutrality or net-zero emissions by 2050.

Power

Non-fossil (renewable and nuclear) power is prioritized to bolster domestic, decarbonized power. South Korea and Japan back nuclear expansions. 

Renewables are primarily supported through competitive auctions and long-term revenue support mechanisms.

- South Korea targets 100 GW of renewable capacity by 2030, up from around 37 GW today, and rising from 11% of generation in 2025 to 20% by 2030. The First Basic Plan for Renewable Energy targets 30% of power by 2035 (Shin & Kim, 2026). Japan targets 36–38% of renewable generation by 2030. Its Long-Term Decarbonization Power Supply Auction provides 20-year capacity payments (JPY/kW/year), improving project bankability by guaranteeing fixed-cost recovery.

- Offshore wind is increasingly linked to industrial policy. Japan’s Second Offshore Wind Industry Vision (2025) targets a 65% domestic procurement ratio, supported by the Green Innovation Fund. South Korea’s Offshore Wind Promotion Act (2025) and auction design favour domestic manufacturing through non-price criterion, while Australia is moving towards its first offshore wind tenders.

- Grid expansion is a major infrastructure priority. Australia continues implementation of the Rewiring Nation programme (DCCEEW, 2026c), while South Korea’s 11th Long-term Plan for Transmission and Substation Equipment foresees approximately USD 52bn in transition investment through 2038 (Jo et al., 2026), alongside upgrades to distribution networks.

Storage

- Australia is the world's third-largest utility-scale battery market and a global leader in residential storage, having expanded its Cheaper Home Batteries Programme in 2025 with a target of 40 GWh by 2030.

- Japan’s 7th Strategic Energy Plan (to fiscal year 2040) prioritizes battery storage and grid flexibility through dedicated subsidy programmes.

- South Korea has government BESS tenders for grid-scale storage. The K-GX industrial strategy has batteries as one of 10 priority green industries. The distribution-network storage programme supports companies in building storage across distribution lines (Publicover, 2026).

Fossil fuels

Governments are strengthening energy security through investments in LNG and oil infrastructure, strategic stockholding, and bilateral fuel-supply agreements, such as Japan with Montenegro and Malaysia (JOGMEC, 2026; METI, 2026d), and between South Korea and Japan (METI, 2026e).

South Korea plans to phase out 40 of 61 existing coal power plants by 2040, replacing capacity with LNG, renewables, pumped hydro, and storage (Sung-soo, 2026).

Carbon capture and storage

CCS is a strategic priority in Australia, Japan, and South Korea and there is high policy readiness with targets, regulatory frameworks, and carbon pricing evolving. Robust policy frameworks are backed by substantial value-chain CAPEX support, including co-financing grants, but dedicated OPEX mechanisms are limited, except Australia’s ACCU-based carbon credit system.

Japan’s Act on Carbon Dioxide Storage Businesses was enforced in May 2026, creating the practical enabling regime for project developers/investors. Its policy support catalyses projects in South East Asia as 60% of Japan’s shortlisted projects rely on cross-border CO2 export. It also has dedicated support for carbon dioxide removal (System Change Lab, 2026).

Hydrogen

There is a strong push towards clean hydrogen with broad use prioritized in Japan and South Korea. Japan’s 7th Strategic Energy Plan targets 20 Mt/yr and 30 Mt/yr in hydrogen and ammonia, respectively by 2050 (Shulman, 2025). Region incentives include low-cost loans, funding programmes and long-term revenue support/‘cost-gap' subsidies through 15–20-year CfDs (DNV, 2026).

- Japan advanced the first CfD allocation in December 2025.

- South Korea’s focus is shifting towards domestic hydrogen production and avoiding extending the lifetime of fossil energy and coal plants. It cancelled the second round of clean hydrogen power generation bidding in 2025, reversing the national strategy for coal-ammonia co-firing (FCW, 2026).

- In May 2026, Australia revised funding in the 2026 federal budget downwards from AUD 2bn (USD 1.45bn) to AUD 1bn in the Hydrogen Headstart programme. Seven renewable H₂ projects were shortlisted to progress to the next application process stage for subsidies (HPTI, ten-year tax incentive per kgH2 under Future Made in Australia scheme) in which four projects aim for methanol production (ARENA, 2026). Overall, Australia targets exports, and policy remains skewed towards supply.

Manufacturing

Clean hydrogen use and CCS in hard-to-decarbonize sectors have multipronged policies.

- Japan’s GX (Green Transformation) 2040 Vision and the 7th Strategic Energy Plan integrate industrial competitiveness with decarbonization support.

- South Korea's Carbon Neutral Transition Leading Project Loan Support Scheme offers low-interest loans to carbon reduction and research (Kang, 2026).

- Both Japan and South Korean support the full hydrogen value chain, including specialized industrial complexes, through regulation and incentives.

 Australia’s Future Made programme focuses on low-carbon manufacturing, particularly green metals/minerals. New Zealand’s Government Investment in Decarbonising Industry (GIDI) Fund emphasizes process-heat electrification and fuel switching with grants and co-investment.

Zero-emission transport

Transport policy is centred on vehicle electrification with national or regional EV sales targets extending into the mid-2030s. Japan and South Korea maintain stronger support for hydrogen mobility than most regions, including leading support for fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) linked to industrial competitiveness and green transformation goals.

Sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) and low-carbon maritime fuels are emerging priorities. Japan targets 10% SAF use by 2030, while South Korea targets 7-10% by 2035. Australia supports SAF production through its Future Made in Australia programme.

- Japan and South Korea also promote clean hydrogen/ammonia fuels for shipping.

Buildings

- Near net-zero energy standards are evolving, such as Japan making compliance with residential energy-efficiency standards mandatory for all new homes from April 2025, with standards set to tighten further towards zero-emissions by 2030 (ACEEE, 2025).

- Policy advances building electrification alongside hydrogen demonstrations.

- Rooftop solar continues to expand through net-metering frameworks and FIT/FIP schemes. In Australia, policy encourages demand shifting to midday solar generation through the Solar Sharer Offer (three-hours of free electricity) launched in 2026.

Carbon pricing

Regional carbon prices are projected to average USD 25 /tCO2 in 2030 and around USD 95/tCO2 in 2050. Carbon pricing mechanisms exist across all countries but currently provide relatively weak price signals. Japan’s ETS became mandatory in 2026. South Korea’s ETS faces overallocation and price volatility. Australian emissions benchmarks remain high, meaning few installations pay. New Zealand’s ETS uniquely covers forestry and land use emissions.

 Note: For policy details and how policy factors are incorporated into the analysis, please see the main ETO 2026 publication.

 

References versions

References versions