The loss of the MSC Napoli was a spectacular case, not least because of the amazing looting by scavengers. The detailed and remarkably frank inquiry report is now available.
The loss of the MSC Napoli was a spectacular case, not least because of the amazing looting by scavengers. The detailed and remarkably frank inquiry report is now available.
By Max Johns – translated to English from the article on the following pages.
When, in January 2007, the container ship MSC Napoli was towed to the south coast of England, the case took a spectacular turn. In particular, the television footage of the scavengers who were looting the beached containers made for worldwide surprise. This case occupied the salvors and the insurance companies in particular for months. Since this involves an extremely rare case of the loss of a large-sized container ship with apparently structural deficiencies, the now available inquiry report was eagerly awaited.
Report by DNV
At the same time as the British Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), which had been officially appointed to conduct the inquiry, Det Norske Veritas (DNV), the class society responsible for the ship, also submitted its report.
DNV did not hesitate to word its report in explicit terms, declaring that something had been “fundamentally wrong”. Such an accident should never have occurred.
What is remarkable about DNV’s report is the absolute frankness and clarity with which the problem has been described and classified and the far-reaching conclusions which have been drawn. The shipping world is frequently criticised for secretiveness, although this is, in most cases, without cause. DNV has now demonstrated how difficult subjects have to be approached openly. When there is such an obvious structural problem as in this case, the class society is the first to come under scrutiny, since it is the one that is supposed to guarantee the safe structure of the ship. DNV was all the more alarmed since it is only recently that it has started trying to break into the container ship market, which is particularly a preserve of GL.
A victim of the Kyrill windstorm
But back to the actual case in hand. When the MSC Napoli started out on its maiden voyage in 1992, she was the largest container ship in the world. It is important to remember this, since the shipyard had to break new ground with extreme tonnage, similar to today’s 13,000 TEU vessels. Like the CMA CGM Normandie, she ran aground with great force on a reef in the Singapore Strait in early 2001, remained stuck there for several weeks and was then repaired in Vietnam.
On January 18, 2007, the MSC Napoli set sail from the port of Antwerp bound for Spain. Weather conditions were extraordinarily rough, with wave heights of up to 9m. On land, the Kyrill windstorm had already caused devastation throughout continental Europe and claimed fatalities. When the 275m-long ship came out in the open sea at a speed of about 11 knots, an alarm was sent from the bilge. The damage was soon found. With the naked eye, it was possible to detect a vertical crack in the outer ship’s side near the deckhouse. A sure sign that the hull was broken, damage which, however, is more or less unknown in container ships. At that time, something comparable had been encountered in other ships, particularly in bulkers.
The Bulgarian captain headed for Branscombe Bay on the south coast of England and had the ship evacuated in what was frequently praised as a level-headed rescue action. Despite extreme weather conditions, no one came to any harm.
The windstorm and the damage which the ship had incurred in the past initially seemed to suggest quite a simple explanation for the accident. The inquiries conducted by MAIB and DNV have revealed, however, that the damage incurred in 2001 can in no way relate to the present break-up. There must have been a different cause, and this is also more alarming.
The fact that the shipping agents had, to a considerable extent, declared an incorrect weight for the containers was a matter of concern. But that alone failed to provide an explanation.
The engineers then examined the ship’s structure at the point of breakage in more detail and discovered that there was in fact a major structural deficiency exactly at the interface between the bridge section and the first bay. The engine room, which was, as is usually the case, located below the bridge, contained stiffening that was different to that used in the cargo sections. There was a difference in the structure’s main stability elements at precisely this critical point, which is constantly subjected to the utmost strain from longitudinal to transverse. A fatal compromise for the ship’s overall stability, as was to be demonstrated 16 years after the ship had first been launched.
It must also be clearly said, however, that DNV was not responsible for supervising the construction of the ship but only assumed responsibility during the later lifetime of the MSC Napoli.
The consequences
It was unlikely that the MSC Napoli was an isolated case, a “one-off bad job”. Hence, while the initial results were becoming apparent, DNV enlisted the cooperation of other IACS societies and tried to trace all the ships which could feature a similar structural deficiency. Apparently, there are in fact a dozen comparable cases. But even this result has not led to any immediate removal from service. This structural deficiency as found in similar cases can be eliminated by means of additional stiffening, entailing minimum work. The MSC Napoli is therefore a tragic case. Its exemplary handling means that it has been possible to avert future damage. Credit is to be given to DNV for its inquiry and frank approach to the, in some cases, alarming data.
The full report, including with additional animations, can be viewed at http://www.dnv.com/press_area/press_releases/2008/dnvconcludes.asp